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CHOICE OF LAW IN ONLINE LEGAL ETHICS:
CHANGING A VAGUE STANDARD FOR
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING ON THE INTERNET
Daniel Backer :
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has exploded as a commercial medium across almost
all industries and professions, and the practice of law is no exception.
Although lawyers are catching on to the information revolution at a
slower pace than other professions, they are nevertheless becoming
increasingly technology-oriented.' While most lawyers and law firms
use the Internet primarily as a marketing tool,2 there are now online
services that give state-specific explanations of law, prepare various
legal documents, and even offer computer-mediated dispute
resolution.' In addition, lawyers and law firms are using web pages to
solicit class-action plaintiffs, to participate in real-time chat forums,
and to bid for legal engagements
While this new technology is proving to be an extremely important
medium for the practice of law, it raises a number of ethical issues.5
The uncertainty that exists when applying ethics rules to emerging
technologies has led many jurisdictions to conclude that existing ethics
rules apply to websites in the same way they apply to conventional
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Michael Berch for directing me to this topic. I would also like to thank my
parents and my sister for their unwavering support. Lastly, a special thanks to Paula
Reynolds for never letting me give up on this Note.
1. See Kate Marquess, Caught in the Web: Survey Reveals Increasing Use of
Internet in Law Practices, but Lawyers are Making Transition Sloiwy, 86 A.B.A. J. 76
(2000).
2. See J. Clayton Athey, Note, The Ethics of Attorney Web Sites: Updating the
Model Rules to Better Deal with Emerging Technologies, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 499.
507-08 (2000).
3. eLawyering: In Practice, at httpJ/vvww.elawyering.orglwhatlpractice.asp (last
visited Mar. 19, 2002) (listing "innovative approaches to the use of technology in the
practice of law").
4. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (2000), http:/Iwww.dcbar.orglattorney-
resourceslopinions.cfn#ethics (discussing the solicitation of plaintiffs for class action
lawsuits and obtaining legal work through Internet-based web pages).
5. J.T. Westermeier, Ethical Issues for Lawyers on the Internet and World Wde




attorney communications. Although it is feasible to draw analogies
between traditional media and the Internet for some types of online
conduct,7 existing ethics rules are not always a good fit for the issues
presented by the growing online presence of attorneys.
One such issue plaguing attorneys is the question of which state's
ethics laws apply to their conduct on the Internet.' The Internet is
global in nature, and websites are accessible to anyone in the world
with a computer and a telephone line.' As such, websites cut across
all jurisdictional and geographic borders. 10 A potential client may
access information about a lawyer located in a different state in the
same manner and with the same ease as a lawyer in her home state."
The extra-territorial nature of the Internet is at odds with the way
the legal profession is regulated in the United States. The American
Bar Association promulgates model rules governing attorneys, 2 to be
adopted by each state's highest court. Although the states have
generally implemented model ethics rules proposed by the American
Bar Association, 3 there are substantial variations among states on a
number of ethics issues. 4 Most of these differences appear in rules
relating to lawyer advertising and solicitation. 5 In fact, only nine
states have adopted rules on lawyer communications that exactly
match those promulgated by the ABA."
6. Id. 15.
7. For example, jurisdictions have successfully applied Model Rule 7.3
concerning solicitation to newsgroups. In 1993, Cantor and Siegel, a Phoenix law
firm, posted off-topic messages to every Usenet group advertising their services.
After thousands of complaints, the principal of the firm was disbarred. See Amy
Haywood & Melissa Jones, Note, Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty: How Existing
Ethical Guidelines Pertain to the Marketing of Legal Services Over the Internet, 14
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1099, 1109 (2001).
8. See Anthony E. Davis, Ethics and Etiquette of Lawyering on the Internet- Part
2, N.Y. L.J., July 3,2000, at 3.
9. See Westermeier, supra note 5, 2 ("[W]ebsites are in essence storefronts with
worldwide exposure. There are no countries or state borders on the Internet.").
10. Id.
11. Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Communications on the Internet: Beginning the
Millennium with Disparate Standards, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 785, 847 (2000).
12. Id. at 810.
13. Id. Forty-three states have adopted the model rules in some form. Id. at 810-
11.
14. See Westermeier, supra note 5, % 3 ("To keep pace with the law of legal ethics
in the United States, for example, one must have the ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on
Profession Conduct ... Hazard and Hodus' [sic] The Law of Lawyering, local statutes
and opinions from applicable local ethics rules committees and local bar counsel.").
15. See Hill, supra note 11, at 810.
16. See Alaska Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.1-7.3 (1999); Del. Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 7.1-7.3 (1999); Haw. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.1-7.3 (1999); Idaho
Rules of Profl Conduct R. 7.1-7.3 (2000); N.H. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.1-7.3
(1999); Utah Rules of Profl Conduct R. 7.1-7.3 (1999); Wash. Rules of Prof I Conduct
R. 7.1-7.3 (1999); W. Va. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.1-7.3 (1999); Wyo. Rules of
Prof'1 Conduct R. 7.1-7.3 (2000).
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These jurisdictional variations, combined with the a-jurisdictional
nature of the Internet, create a dilemma for the lawyer who
disseminates information electronically on a website. The lawyer
must ascertain whose standards will apply to his online conduct, and
whether he will be subject to discipline by virtue of such conduct.17
American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct
8.5(b)(2)(ii) confronts this problem by proposing a choice of law rule
in which a lawyer is subject to the rule of the jurisdiction where the
"predominant effect" of his conduct is felt, if he is licensed to practice
in that jurisdiction'8
This "predominant effect" test was meant to be a narrow exception
to the general choice of law rule for ethics violations." According to
the official comment to the rule, the test applies to situations where
lawyers principally practicing in one state handle a transaction that
occurs wholly in another state in which they are licensed .2- However,
in the context of an attorney's use of the Internet, the "predominant
effect" test is problematic, because it is difficult to discern where the
predominant effect of Internet activity is felt.21 Rule 8.5(b), therefore,
potentially subjects lawyers and law firms to the ethics rules of any
state in which they are licensed to practice.
Part L.A of this Note will provide background information
regarding attorneys' use of the Internet. Part I.B will discuss efforts
by states to regulate online advertising by attorneys. Part I.C will
discuss the American Bar Association's choice of law rule, 8.5(b).
Part II will explain the problems created by the vague language in
Rule 8.5(b), and how those problems are implicated when attorneys
market themselves online. Part II will further discuss the various
competing solutions that have been suggested to resolve these
problems. Part III proposes amending Rule 8.5(b) so that the
"predominant effect" test will no longer be applied to online legal
advertising.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Attorney Use of the Internet
The main reason behind the growth of attorney presence on the
Internet is marketing,'- and the majority of online marketing exists in
17. See Hill, supra note 11. at 847.
18. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5 (2001).
19. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. (2001).
20. Id
21. See Davis, supra note 8.
22. Jesse H. Sweet, Note, Attorney Advertising on the Information Superhighway:
A Crash Course in Ethics, 24 J. Legal Prof. 201, 205 (1999/2000) (discussing the
reasons law firms use websites as marketing tools).
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the form of attorney websites. 3  Most firms realize that "their
websites assist them in selling themselves to prospective clients by
providing inquiries and leads, '2 4 and that "[l]aw firms that rely solely
on Martindale-Hubbell or paper brochures risk not being seen by
these potential clients."'  Since 1994, when the first major law firm
website was launched,26 almost all large law firms and many small
firms and solo practitioners have made a place for themselves on the
World Wide Web.27
One commentator has drawn a distinction between "interactive"
and "noninteractive" legal websites.28 "Noninteractive" websites are
the norm for most lawyers and law firms. The most common
functions of these websites are to provide biographical and contact
information for an attorney.29 Although this type of information can
also be accessed from a legal directory, "the convenience of checking
for such information on Web sites is increasingly surpassing the
usefulness of traditional directories. "30 "Noninteractive" websites
often include a firm's history, a lawyer directory, recruitment
information, attorney publications, and news releases.3'
Many of these "noninteractive" websites are becoming increasingly
sophisticated, in order to market the lawyer or firm to potential clients
more effectively. Firms are adding new features and technologies to
their websites in an attempt to "demonstrat[e their] technological
savvy to computer-conscious clientele-in other words, marketing. 32
Websites now include scholarly work by attorneys, intelligent search
engines on various legal topics,3 3 and interactive graphics and
animations. Lawyers are also adding links to other sites, which allow
23. See David J. Romano, L.E.I. 98-03: Attorney Advertising on the Internet, W.
Va. Law., Feb. 1999, at 28, 28 ("the most common form of attorney advertising [on
the Internet] is a website.").
24. Paul F. Lewis, Building a Law Firm Website, Colo. Law., Oct. 1998, at 33, 33.
25. Id.
26. The Baltimore law firm of Venable, Baetjer and Howard claims to hold the
title of the first major law firm website. See Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, So
You Want to Be on the Internet? at http://www.venable.com/Internet/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2002).
27. All of the firms listed on the AmLaw 100, which lists the 100 highest grossing
U.S. law firms, have websites. See http://www.law.com/special/professionals/amlaw/
amlawlOO/amlawlO0highgross.html. (last visited Mar. 19, 2002). In a 1997 survey of
small law firms by the American Bar Association, almost two-thirds of the responding
firms had websites. Hill, supra note 11, at 788. It is almost certain that this number
has risen considerably since 1997.
28. Darren Franklin, Note, Hanging a Shingle on the Information Superhighway:
Legal Advice on the Internet and the Problems of Prohibited Client Solicitation and
Unintended Attorney-Client Relationships, 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2, IT 3-4, at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/Ol_STLR_2.
29. Athey, supra note 2, at 508.
30. Id.
31. Franklin, supra note 28, 3.
32. Sweet, supra note 22, at 208.
33. Id. at 208 & n.34.
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users to "'move seamlessly between documents, regardless of their
location."'" Most lawyers and firms believe that a website with "good
substantive content" will be more effective at attracting new legal
work than "those that serve merely as electronic billboards." -
In the past several years, lawyers as well as Internet startups have
extended the boundaries of typical attorney websites by offering
"interactive" features and services to users.-' These websites often go
beyond simple marketing to the actual practice of law over the
Internet. The eLawyering Committee of the American Bar
Association Law Practice Management Section has divided these
innovative websites into three categories: law firm websites,
lawyer/client marketplaces, and law-related organizations.-
Law firms are finding new ways to deliver legal services to clients,
and to attract new clients. For example, some firms have used private,
web-based "chat" or "deal" rooms to "keep clients informed and well
advised, at significantly lower costs than traditional service models. ' s
Law firms are also including online bulletin boards on their websites
in order to develop virtual "communities" for marketing purposes.
The Washington, D.C. firm of Arent Fox sponsors a discussion forum
on the advertising law section of its website.3 9 This web-based
discussion group invites lawyers and potential clients to discuss issues
in advertising law.' Through these types of online forums, firms are
able to disseminate information to current clients and draw new
clients to their website.
Firms are also finding ways to deliver traditional legal functions and
services online. The large personal injury firm Jacoby & Meyers
offers what it calls the "J&M Instant Interview,"'" an online client
intake form, in which the potential client is asked a series of pre-
programmed questions regarding her claim. A computer program
then evaluates whether the firm is interested in speaking to the user in
person. 2 Another law firm, Connecticut's Webber, Jacobs, Murphy &
Horan, provides free legal advice and preliminary assessments of
cases by e-mail.43 These novel approaches to conduct that is usually
34. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(quoting Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d
Cir. 1997)).
35. Lewis, supra note 24, at 33-34.
36. Franklin, supra note 28, 14.
37. eLawyering: In Practice, at http.//www.elavyering.org/what/practice.asp (last
visited Mar. 19,2002).
38. eLawyering Basics, at http'//vwv.elawyering.org/whatibasics.asp (last visited
Mar. 19,2002).
39. See http://wwv.arentfox.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
40. Id.
41. See Instant Interview Agreement, at httpil/www.jacoby-meyers.com/cgi-
binlInstantlnterveiew.pl (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
42. Id.
43. See http://www.freelegal.com (last visited Mar. 19,2002).
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carried out in law firm offices demonstrate a growing desire among
law firms to tap "a wholly new market of un-met legal needs."'
Many web-based companies owned and operated by lawyers also
provide legal services online.' Some of these companies are in the
business of providing "lawyer/client marketplaces," in which the
website acts as an intermediary between clients and lawyers.
Companies such as eLawForum, AttorneysBid.com, and FirstLAW
allow lawyers to submit bids to prospective clients.46 The clients can
then decide which bid to accept, and negotiate the terms of the
representation directly with the lawyer. By using the Internet to bring
market forces to bear on legal practice, these websites make it simpler
for firms to locate new clients, and allow individuals to shop more
easily for affordable legal services.
Other online companies, categorized as "law-related
organizations," offer an array of legal services to Internet users,
47
including legal information, dispute resolution, document preparation,
and research aids. For instance, American Law Online contains a host
of detailed, state-specific legal information, and also provides a
document assembly service for which it charges a fee.48
Cybersettle.com is a computer-mediated method of settling insurance
claims online, which charges a fee if the settlement is successful.49
MyCounsel.com is a wholly online law firm, in which users prepay for
legal services ranging from consultations to document preparation to
court filings."
All of these examples, which are by no means exhaustive,
demonstrate that the Internet is becoming increasingly integrated into
the practice of law. If attorneys are to remain competitive, they will
find it extremely difficult to ignore this trend and continue to deliver
legal services in exactly the same way they have in the past.5
44. eLawyering Basics at http://www.elawyering.org/what/basics.asp (last visited
Mar. 19,2002).
45. Id.
46. AttorneysBid.com, for example, operates by allowing
[a]ttorneys interested in securing clients via the internet [to] register with
Legal-Bid.com giving their areas of expertise and the states in which they are
licensed to practice. Individuals or companies with a need for legal services
log on to Legal-Bid.com, list the county and state in which they reside, and
describe in very general terms the type of legal service which they are
requesting. After obtaining more specific details directly from the
prospective clients, the lawyers then submit bids, leaving the client in the
enviable position of deciding which bid to accept.
http://www.Attomeysbid.com (last visited Mar. 13,2002).
47. eLawyering: In Practice, at http:llwww.elawyering.orglwhat/practice.asp (last
visited Mar. 19,2002).
48. See http://www.americanlawonline.com (last visited Mar. 19,2002).
49. See http://www.cybersettle.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
50. See http://www.mycounsel.com/app/consumers/whymycounsel/ how.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2002).
51. For an interesting account of the way attorneys historically have been
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However, this new technology also raises a host of ethical issues for
lawyers.5 This Note will address one of the most confusing issues for
lawyers who use the Internet in their practice of law-the
determination of which ethics rules to follow. Specifically, this Note
will focus on rules relating to advertising and solicitation.
B. Rules Regarding Online Attorney Advertising and Solicitation
For the first three quarters of the twentieth century, advertising by
attorneys was condemned by professional bar organizations, and, by
1937, all forms of media advertising, except in ABA-approved law
lists, were prohibited?3 By 1970, a leading treatise on professional
responsibility asserted that "the solicitation of professional
employment by direct or indirect advertising is unprofessional.' 4 In
1977, however, the Supreme Court held in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona 5 that attorney advertising was commercial speech, and that
the "blanket suppression" of such advertising was impermissible. ' A
state, however, could place reasonable restriction on the time, place
and manner of lawyer advertising.' A series of Supreme Court
decisions after Bates arrived at the basic principles that attorney
advertising can be regulated but not prohibited, and that certain forms
of attorney solicitation are protected, but that face-to-face and
telephone solicitation can be prohibited.-
ambivalent to new technology, and the problems that have arisen from such
ambivalence, see Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace:
The Peril and the Promise, 49 Duke L.J. 147, 164-68 (1999).
52- See Ethical Issues: Summary, at http/wwwv.ela%,yering.orgiethicsfethics.asp
(last visited Mar. 19, 2002) (listing advertising, competence and duty to inform,
confidentiality, conflicts, legal fees and duties to prospective clients, and unauthorized
practice of law as ethics issues that are implicated by technology).
53. See J. Gordon Hylton, Professional Values and Individual Autonomy: The
United States Supreme Court and Lawyer Advertising 11-33 (1998).
54. Id. at 36 (citing Raymond L. Wise, Legal Ethics 134 (2d ed. 1970)). The
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, as originally adopted in 1969, provided
that "'lawyer[s] shall not publicize [themselves] ... through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements... or other means of commercial
publicity."' Hill, supra note 11, at 792 (quoting Model Code of Prof'i Responsibility
DR 2-101(B) (1969)).
55. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
56. Id. at 383.
57. Id. at 384.
58. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding thirty-day ban
on mailed solicitations to accident victims); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. and Prof l
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (upholding the right of a lawyer to truthfully
communicate that she was a CPA, even though doing so violated the professional
rules governing accountants in Florida); Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Comm'n of I11., 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that a state cannot prohibit a
lawyer from including on a letterhead a truthful statement that the lawyer is certified
as a specialist in a particular legal field, even if the state does not provide for
certification of specialties); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding
that truthful and nondeceptive mail targeted to individuals with a specific need could
not be prohibited); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
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With these principles in mind, the American Bar Association has
proposed rules governing attorney advertising and solicitation 59 aimed
principally at prohibiting lawyers from communicating "false or
misleading" information regarding their services.' The Model Rules
also "require attorneys to limit their direct contact with potential
clients. ' 61 In line with the Supreme Court decisions discussed above,6"
the Model Rules are intended to "allow truthful and nondeceptive
advertising subject to defined limitations and restrictions."'63
Unfortunately, the Model Rules do not directly address how to
apply the rules to lawyer advertising and solicitation over the Internet,
and the case law on the subject is sparse. This situation has forced
state bar associations to address the issue through their own formal
and informal opinions. A consensus has developed that attorney
websites are commercial speech and subject to state ethics rules
regarding advertising and solicitation.' 4 Most states have determined
that, under their existing rules, attorney websites can be considered
advertising, but are generally not considered solicitation.
In Iowa, an ethics ruling determined that websites "'are generally
designed to promote the firm and to sell legal services of the firm and
constitute advertising.' ' 66  The ethics committee consequently
concluded that attorney websites must conform to the Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility.67 Similarly, the Standing Committee of
Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the State Bar of California
recently concluded that an attorney's website is a "communication,"
(holding that states may not prevent lawyers from making accurate statements of fact
concerning their experience); In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding that states
may not put an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information if the information may also be presented in a way that is not deceptive);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (holding in-person solicitation
for pecuniary gain subject to regulation); In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding
solicitation for social cause and no pecuniary gain permissible).
59. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.1-7.5 (2001); see also William E.
Hornsby, Jr., Marketing and Legal Ethics: The Boundaries of Promoting Legal
Services 15-16 (3d ed. 2000) (providing a brief outline of Model Rules 7.1 through
7.5).
60. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.1 cmt. (2001) ("Whatever means are
used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful.").
61. Athey, supra note 2, at 503.
62. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63. Hornsby, supra note 59, at 16.
64. Francis G.X. Pileggi, Ethics Rules and the Internet, The Metropolitan
Corporate Counsel, Oct. 1999, at 17 (discussing the application of Zauderer to
attorney websites).
65. Westermeier, supra note 5, 18. At least two states, Texas and Florida, have
put specific restrictions on electronic media, including websites. See Haywood &
Jones, supra note 7, at 1113.
66. Westermeier, supra note 5, 6 (quoting Joan Rogers, How Do Advertising &
Rules Apply to Lawyers on the Net?, 12 ABA/BNA Law. Manual on Professional
Conduct 37).
67. Westermeier, supra note 5, 7.
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and is therefore subject to all of the California ethics rules governing
attorney communications.6  Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia also have
determined that their own particular advertising rules govern
websites.69
While applying existing ethics rules to attorney websites might seem
an easy solution to the regulation of lawyers' online conduct, it creates
an untenable situation for lawyers who are licensed to practice in
multiple states. This is because the Internet is "not limited to
geographical or jurisdictional boundaries,"' while rules pertaining to
advertising and solicitation vary significantly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.71 These circumstances make it extremely difficult for an
attorney to determine which states' ethics rules may be violated by
any particular online conduct.
Attorney websites are subject to different requirements, depending
on the jurisdiction. 2 Of the states that have adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, approximately eighty percent have
provisions that differ from Model Rules 7.1-7.5 regarding lawyer
communications.73 These variations concern a number of issues,
including the disclosure of contingent fees,74  the emotional
vulnerability of prospective clients,"5 filing and screening of
advertising content,7 6 disclaimer requirements," and record-keeping
requirements.78
For example, Florida, Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio
have expressly prohibited the use of testimonials in advertising. 9 By
contrast, California, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Wisconsin all permit the use of testimonials or
68. See State Bar of Cal. Standing Committee on Prorl Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 2001-155 (2001), www.calbar.org/2pub/3eth/Ca2001-155.htm
(also determining that attorneys' websites do not implicate solicitation rules, even
where users are directed to the website from another site).
69. Westermeier, supra note 5, T 18.
70. Pa. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op.
98-85 (1998).
71. Westermeier, supra note 5, $1 5.
72. Id.
73. Hill, supra note 11, at 811. Furthermore, even where states have adopted the
same language pertaining to advertising, judicial interpretations may lead to
conflicting applications of the same rule. Cf H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and
Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 73, 96 (1997)
(discussing the no-contaict rule as an example of such "interpretive disparity").
74. Hill, supra note 11, at 811.
75. 1l
76. Id. at 811-12.
77. Westermeier, supra note 5, $ 20.
78. Id
79. Hill, supra note 11, at 812 n.143; Fla. Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 4-7.2(b)
(2001); Ind. Rules of Prof'l Conduct 7.1(d)(3) (2001); Nev. Rules of Profl Conduct R.
195(4) (1999); N.M. Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 16-701(a)(2) (2001), Ohio Code of
Prof'I Responsibility DR 2-101(a)(3) (1999).
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endorsements, as long as they include certain disclaimers."'j
Therefore, if a lawyer licensed to practice in both Nevada and
California were to include a testimonial on his website, even if that
testimonial was only directed to Nevada clients, he would be in
violation of the ethical rules of California and subject to discipline.
Another example of these variations among ethics rules can be seen
in ABA Model Rule 7.5(b), which provides that "[a] law firm with
offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each
jurisdiction."8  While most states have adopted this rule,82 Nevada
ethics rules provide that all of the named partners in a law firm must
be licensed to practice in Nevada, or, if deceased or retired, must have
been licensed in Nevada at the time of their death or retirement. 3
These variations in legal advertising rules make it difficult, if not
impossible, to formulate a uniform approach to Internet regulation.'
The absence of such uniformity, coupled with the growth in the
number of lawyers online,' has led to increasing problems "for
lawyers attempting to comply with the applicable ethics rules."86
C. Model Rule 8.5(b): Choice of Law
1. Background of Choice of Law Doctrine
The necessity for a body of law to decide which laws a court will
apply to particular conduct arises out of the simple fact that we live in
a world with many different governments, all with separate legal
systems.' Choice of law doctrine developed in American
jurisprudence as a response to legal problems in which the elements of
the problem had contacts with more than one of these governments.18
80. Hill, supra note 11 at 812 n.145; Cal. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1-400 (1999);
La. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 7.1(a)(vi) (1999); Mo. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R.
7.1(g) (1997); Or. Code of Prof'1 Responsibility DR 2-101(A)(6) (2000); Pa. Rules of
Prof'l Conduct R. 7.2(e) (1998); Va. Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 7.1(a)(4) (2000); Wis.
Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 20:7.1 (2001).
81. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.5(b) (2000).
82. See Haywood & Jones, supra note 7, at 1110.
83. Nev. Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 199 (1999).
84. Westermeier, supra note 5, 22.
85. Hill, supra note 11, at 812 n.145.
86. Id.
87. Luther L. McDougal, III, et al., American Conflicts Law § 8 (5th ed. 2001)(stating that conflict law is "little but a nuisance," but that it is necessary because
"state lines divid[e] human activity into territorial compartments that are often
disregarded in commerce and industry and in ordinary social intercourse").
88. Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials 1 (Peter Hay et al. eds., 11th ed. 2000).
American choice of law doctrine was largely developed in America, and not handed
down from English jurisprudence. This was a result of the early establishment in
England of a common law for the entire realm, combined with the use of a legal
fiction by which English courts assumed that all facts in international cases occurred
in England. Consequently, England did not develop a consistent body of choice of law
2418 [Vol. 70
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The growth of this body of law, however, has often been
controversial.' The difficulty inherent in formulating choice of law
rules lies in the tension between providing "uniform solutions" that
protect "the legitimate expectation[s] of the parties,"' and respecting
a state's interest in having its law applied in a multistate case.9
Early courts avoided this tension by applying rules that generally
utilized a single specified type of contact with a conflict, such as
domicile or place of injury, to identify which state's law should govern
the controversy.92  These approaches adequately protected the
expectations of the parties as to which law would apply to their
conduct, and lent stability and certainty to choice of law problems. 3
However, they ignored the fact that states have an interest in the
application of their laws, and the policies that underlie them, to
certain multi-jurisdictional disputes.94
In recognition of this lack of balance between certainty and states'
interests, many courts began in the 1950s to use "escape devices" to
avoid application of the rigid and mechanical traditional rules. These
"escape devices" consisted of recharacterizing the cases before the
court in order to achieve the desired result. An example of such a
case is Grant v. McAuliffe,9 which involved an automobile collision
between California residents in Arizona. The plaintiff sued the
defendant's estate for injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's
alleged negligence. Under Arizona law, tort actions do not survive
the tortfeasor's death, while under California law they do." Justice
Traynor avoided applying the traditional rule that the place of the
wrong-here Arizona-governs the choice of law in tort cases by
characterizing the issue of survival of causes of action as one of
procedure, not of substantive state law. He therefore concluded that
"survival of causes of action should be governed by the law of the
rules until late in the nineteenth century, by which time America had many decades of
experience with conflicts law. Id. at 3-4.
89. Perspectives on Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law 1 (James A. Martin ed., 1980)
("Conflicts is an area of the law noted for disputations over theory.").
90. Ernst Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 94 (2d ed. 1958).
91. See Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revohtion: A Critique, 83 Colum. L
Rev. 772, 811 (1983) (discussing a series of essays by Brainerd Currie which first
advocated consideration of state policies in choice of law analysis).
92. See, e.g., Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships. Ltd., 43 F.2d 824 (2d. Cir.
1930) (using the place of contract formation to decide choice of contract law); Ala.
G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (using the place of injury to decide
choice of substantive tort law); In Re Jones' Estate, 182 N.W. 227 (Iowa 1921) (using
place of domicile to decide choice of law on intestate succession).
93. See Korn, supra note 91, at 778-79.
94. For example, in a case involving intestate succession, rigidly applying the law
of the decedent's domiciliary state, where the law of that state and the state in which a
relative of the decedent lives would produce differing results, ignores the interests of
the relative's state in applying its policy of intestate succession to the case.
95. 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
96. Id. at 946.
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forum." '  By this reasoning, Justice Traynor was able to apply
California law and allow the California plaintiff to seek redress for his
injuries.98
The use of these "escape devices" to evade traditional choice of law
rules prompted many commentators and courts to search for new
approaches. This search led to the modem approach to choice of law,
in which courts analyze the relative contacts between the state laws
and parties to the dispute, taking into account the interests and
policies underlying these laws.99 This approach, often called the
"center of gravity" approach, aims to "giv[e] controlling effect to the
law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact
with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation. ' 1 °
The center-of-gravity approach analyzes relative contacts and
competing governmental interests in the hope of arriving at "the
better rule of law." 10 Some commentators, however, have criticized
this approach, at least as it is currently applied, on the grounds that it
does not strike the correct balance between achieving this better rule
and providing certainty to individuals as to which law will govern their
conduct."° Although many commentators have differed on how best
to strike this balance, most agree that "[c]ertainty and predictability in
decisions appear to still be a long way away."103
97. Id. at 949.
98. Justice Schauer delivered a vigorous dissent to this approach, saying that it
allows the court to "apply one 'rule' or another as the untrammeled whimsy of the
majority may from time to time dictate." Id. at 950 (Schauer, J., dissenting). Other
courts found various ways of recharacterizing the issues before them in order to reach
what they felt was the proper choice of law. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto
Renting Co., 143 A. 163 (Conn. 1928) (characterizing the issue in an automobile
collision case as one of contract, and applying "place of making" rule instead of
"place of wrong" rule); Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis.
1959) (recharacterizing a tort issue as a standing issue to avoid applying the "place of
wrong" rule, and instead applying the "place of domicile" rule).
99. For a detailed discussion and critical analysis of this modern approach to
choice of law, see Korn, supra note 91.
100. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963). This principal is
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law. (2) When there is no such
directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the
relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
101. See American Conflicts Law, supra note 87, § 4, at 8.
102. See Korn, supra note 91, at 960 (describing current choice of law concepts as
"unpredictable and unprincipled").
103. American Conflicts Law, supra note 87, § 4, at 9.
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2. Choice of Law in Legal Ethics
Before 1993, the problem of how best to formulate a choice of law
rule in the realm of legal ethics was exacerbated by "the limited body
of law and commentary [which]... left all the crucial questions in
regard to choice of law for legal ethics unanswered.""" Courts and
disciplinary panels had no clear-cut rule for dealing with choice of law
in the sphere of legal ethics." As a result, disciplinary committees and
courts that dealt with this issue applied inconsistent approaches in
choosing which ethics rules applied to particular conduct." For
example, some states required their attorneys to follow their ethics
rules, even when practicing in another admitting state."'7 Other states
simply looked to the rules of the jurisdiction where the conduct
occurred.'08 Still other states applied a more typical modern choice of
law analysis, applying the rules of the jurisdiction that had the greatest
interest in the matter.19
In 1993, The American Bar Association attempted to resolve this
confusion by amending Model Rule 8.5 to delineate which state's
ethics rules would apply to attorney conduct."" The choice of law
framework adopted in the amendment recognized that a lawyer "may
be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional
conduct which impose different obligations.""' Amended Model
Rule 8.5, subsection (b) provides that
[i)n any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the
rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: (1)
for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which
a lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or for the
purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the
court provide otherwise; and (2) for any other conduct, (i) if the
lawyer is licensed to practice only in this jurisdiction, the rules to be
applied shall be the rules of this jurisdiction, and (ii) if the lawyer is
licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction, the rules to be
applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the
lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if particular
104. Arvid E. Roach, II, The Virtues of Clarity: The ABA's New Choice of Law
Rule for Legal Ethics, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 907, 920 (1995).
105. Id at 918-19.
106. Id. at 918.
107. See Cal. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1-100(d)(1) (2000) (requiring California
bar members licensed in other states to follow California rules outside of the state,
except when another licensing jurisdiction specifically required them to follow
different rules).
108. Roach, supra note 104, at 919.
109. Id; see also Fla. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 88-10 (1988) (applying the ethics rules
of the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the client and the cause of
action).
110. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5 (2001).
111. R. 8.5 cmt. 2.
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conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction
shall be applied to that conduct. 2
Model Rule 8.5(b) was drafted in response to a concern by the
American Bar Association that lawyers lacked "clear guidance" when
they faced conflicting obligations, a belief that was "exacerbated by
the fact that existing authority as to choice of law in the area of ethics
rules is unclear and inconsistent."
'' 3
In 1995, Illinois became the first state to adopt Rule 8.5(b)
verbatim."' Since then, Model Rule 8.5(b) has been adopted by only
seven jurisdictions." 5 The reluctance on the part of the states to
implement the ABA's choice of law rule can be at least partly
attributed to a fear of the inconsistency that would result from the
predominant effect test."6 If the ABA hopes for a uniform choice of
law rule, it must promulgate a standard that allows lawyers to predict,
with reasonable certainty, what rules will govern their conduct.
3. The Predominant Effect Test
Given that Model Rule 8.5(b) exposes lawyers to discipline from
multiple disciplinary authorities," 7 one would think that it should
provide lawyers with a simple method of determining whose rules
they must follow. In fact, that was the goal of Rule 8.5(b)'s drafters,
who wanted to provide "'relatively simple, bright-line rules"' for
112. R. 8.5(b).
113. Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and
Standards 451 (2001) (excerpting ABA Committee Report explaining 1993
amendment to Rule 8.5).
114. Id. at 453.
115. See D.C. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (2001); Il1. Rules of Prof'l Conduct
R. 8.5(b) (1999); Pa. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (1999); Ga. Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 8.5 (2000); N.C. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (2001); Wis. Rules of
Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5 (2001). One state, Vermont, has extended its choice of law rule
even farther than the Model Rules. The Vermont code tracks ABA Rule 8.5(b), but
adds a third subsection to Rule 8.5, providing that in an exercise of Vermont's
disciplinary authority, a court may apply Vermont rules to the conduct of a lawyer not
licensed to practice in Vermont who engages in the practice of law in Vermont. See
Vt. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2)(iii) (1999).
116. See Mark H. Aultman, A Post Conference Reflection: Does Amended Model
Rule 8.5 Help Anyone?, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1055, 1063 (1995) (arguing that, based on
"past experience" and "the merits of the rule itself," states will not adopt Rule
8.5(b)).
117. See id. at 1060 ("[I]t is clear that the rule has not diminished the number of
jurisdictions in which a lawyer is subject to discipline.").
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choice of law. 18 However, many commentators believe that they did
no such thing." 9
Less than two years after it was drafted, Model Rule 8.5(b) was
criticized on the basis that it does not actually serve to resolve the
conflicts created by varying state rules. 1"' Rather, it simply codifies
"utterly irreconcilable conflicts.' 12 1 By subjecting lawyers to the ethics
laws of any jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice,
subsection (b) gives disciplinary panels even "more power in choosing
which inconsistent rules from different jurisdictions and courts to
apply."'" Therefore, it is argued, the rule leads to "greater
uncertainty and unpredictability for lawyers, their clients, and the
agencies that must interpret and apply the rules."'1-' This uncertainty
is at odds with the stated purpose of Model Rule 8.5(b), which was to
bring clarity to choice-of-ethics rules. 24
Subsection (b)(2)(ii) of Model Rule 8.5 attempts to create a "bright-
line rule" by using the concept of "predominant effect." However, the
rule fails to define this term, making application of the rule "more
complicated than its simple language suggests."' This test is
intended to apply when it is clear that the predominant effect of a
lawyer's conduct is in a specifically identified jurisdiction.22 Such
clarity can rarely be achieved in practice. 2 1
Therefore, it has been suggested that the clarity the predominant
effect test was supposed to create is felt only "after the fact"--that is,
after the lawyer has made the determination of whose ethics rules to
follow, and a court has reviewed this choice."z A lawyer is forced to
predict where a court or disciplinary authority would decide the
predominant effect of his conduct would be felt. Furthermore, there
is nothing precluding another agency or court from deciding that the
predominant effect of a lawyer's conduct was felt in an altogether
different place.129 These problems put the lawyer in the same position
118. Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice-Is
Model Rule 8.5 the Ansiver, an Answer, or No Answer at All?. 36 S. Tex. L Rev. 715,
758 (1995) (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Recommendation
and Report to the House of Delegates 4 (1993)).
119. See Gregory B. Adams, Reflections on the Reaction to Proposed Rule 8.5:
Consensus of Failure. 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1101 (1995) (summarizing a 1995 symposium
on the amended Model Rule 8.5, in which all but one of the participants expressed the
belief that the rule would not increase clarity in choice-of-ethics law).
120. Aultman, supra note 116, at 1059.
121. Id.
122- Id. at 1065.
123. Id.
124. See Daly, supra note 118. at 758.
125. Id. at 761.
126. Aultman, supra note 116, at 1062.
127. Id.




he was in before the adoption of subsection (b)-subject to different
and often conflicting standards of conduct.
Model Rule 8.5, therefore, does not lend any simplicity to a lawyer's
decision on whose ethics rules to follow. As one commentator has
observed, "[t]he lawyer has no guidance in deciding what rule to
follow at the time of the conduct.""13 Because predominant effect is
an "inherently vague standard, '1 31 and conduct based on this standard
"may later result in discipline or in litigation in any number of
jurisdictions,"132 a lawyer must find some other method of deciding
whose rules to follow. This problem is particularly implicated in
attorneys' use of websites for marketing purposes.
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY REGARDING APPLICATION OF
ETHICS RULES TO INTERNET USE
A. The Predominant Effect Test and Lawyers' Use of the Internet
The difficulties inherent in the predominant effect test of Model
Rule 8.5 are exemplified when one attempts to apply this test to
lawyers' websites. The a-jurisdictional nature of the Internet, which
gives users easy access to information without regard to state
boundaries, makes identifying a particular jurisdiction where the
predominant effect of a website is felt an impossible task. This is
because "'the Internet is a community without walls or boundaries
that encourages people to indiscriminately communicate and conduct
business over state and national borders."'133 Therefore, a lawyer who
makes information available on a website necessarily crosses all fifty
state lines.'3
It is possible that in the future, technology will allow lawyers to
"filter" their websites to specific geographic areas. This type of
technology may allow lawyers to act in accordance with the rules that
govern the intended jurisdiction. Until such technology becomes
available, however, attorneys who wish to market on the Internet
must identify whose ethics rules will apply to their website.'3 5
In a move that may make the situation even more complicated, the
ABA has proposed removing the restrictions in Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii),
which currently require a lawyer to be licensed in a jurisdiction before
the rules of that jurisdiction can be applied to her.136 Under the
proposed rule, a lawyer would be subject to the rules of any
130. Id. at 1062.
131. Id. at 1065.
132. Id. at 1062.
133. Sweet, supra note 22, at 202 (citation omitted).
134. Hill, supra note 11, at 814.
135. William E. Hornsby, Jr., Marketing and Legal Ethics: The Boundaries of
Promoting Legal Services 107 (2000)
136. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5 (2000).
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jurisdiction in which the predominant effect of her conduct is felt,
regardless of whether or not she is a member of the bar of that
jurisdiction. 7 This proposed change is a result of the ABA
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice's acknowledgment of the
trend towards cross-jurisdictional legal practice.13s  As the
Commission notes, "a jurisdiction in which a lawyer is not admitted
may be the one most interested in disciplining the lawyer for improper
conduct.'
1 39
The comment to this proposed rule indicates recognition that the
predominant effect test is not always clear, and may subject a lawyer
to numerous ethics standards. 11 The drafters have therefore inserted
a clause that allows a tribunal to apply the ethics rule of a "jurisdiction
in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the
lawyer's conduct will occur. "141 However, this addition does not
provide any extra certainty in the context of Internet websites,
because a lawyer can reasonably believe that the effects of a website
may be felt in all jurisdictions. What the proposed change leaves us
with, if adopted, is a rule that intensifies the already confusing
situation of choice of law for attorney websites. 142
In light of the global nature of the Internet, how is a lawyer to
determine which jurisdiction's ethics rules to follow when creating and
137. The proposed rule 8.5(b)(2) reads as follows:
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as
follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the
tribunal provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's
conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a
different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the
conduct. A lawyer is not subject to discipline if the lawvyer's conduct
conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably
believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur.
A.B.A. Comm'n on Evaluation of Prof'l Standards, Proposed Revisions of the ABA
Model Rules R. 8.5 (2000).
138. ABA, Interim Report of the Comm'n on Multijurisdictional Practice 34 (2001)
(citing the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission).
139. Id.
140. See ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Prof'l Standards, Proposed Revisions of
the ABA Model Rules R. 8.5 cmt. 5 (2001) ("When a lawyer's conduct involves
significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the
predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the
one in which the conduct occurred.").
141. ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Proposed Revisions
of the ABA Model Rules, Proposed Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct. R. 8.5(b)(2)
(2000).
142. The American Bar Association has delayed debate on proposed Rule 8-5
pending the completion of the work of the ABA Commission on Multisjurisdictional
Practice. See Patricia Manson, Bar Completes Overhaul of Ethics Rules, Chi. Daily
Law Bull., Feb. 5,2002, at 1.
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maintaining a website that markets himself? Because of the
substantial differences between each state's rules regarding
advertising and solicitation, 43 a lawyer may be faced with as many
rules as jurisdictions in which he (or anyone in his firm) is licensed to
practice.'" Under the proposed amendment to the rule, a lawyer
would have to contend with the rules of as many jurisdictions as
exist. 145 Looking to the Model Rules' choice of law framework for
help in this determination does not provide much guidance.
Subsection (b)(2)(ii) of Model Rule 8.5 would make a website
subject to the rules of the jurisdiction where the predominant effect of
the website would be felt. Websites can be viewed throughout all
jurisdictions, so how can one determine on which state a website will
exercise its predominant effect? Because this question cannot be
answered with any degree of certainty, 46 a number of commentators
and bar opinions have suggested several methods for lawyers to avoid
discipline.
B. The Competing Solutions
1. Solutions Within the Current Regulatory Framework
The most extensive state bar opinion discussing the issue of choice
of law and the Internet is the Pennsylvania Bar Association's Informal
Opinion No. 98-85. This opinion recognized that "[t]he rules
currently in force provide little guidance for resolving these questions
because they are premised on a jurisdictional model that the Internet
does not follow."'47 The opinion suggested that because the Rules of
Professional Conduct are silent on how to determine where a website
has its predominant effect, lawyers admitted in more than one state
should take a "least common denominator" approach.'48 This
approach entails following the advertising rules of the most restrictive
state in which the attorney, or any of the attorneys in a firm, are
licensed. 49
Many commentators have argued that the "least common
denominator" approach imposes an inherently unworkable task upon
a lawyer.150 Where the rules of admitting jurisdictions are conflicting,
143. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
144. See Sweet, supra note 22, at 218.
145. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
146. See Westermeier, supra note 5, 58.
147. Penn. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Lethal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal
Op. N. 98-85 (1998), available at 1998 WL 988187, at *2.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Davis, supra note 8, at 6.
150. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 11, at 848 ("[S]ome lawyers attempt to follow the
course of least resistance and comply with the most stringent regulations among the
applicable states."); Pileggi, supra note 64, at 17 ("[A] lawyer can probably best
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it is not simply an issue of choosing the most restrictive rule.'5' For
example, "the labeling requirements of the various jurisdictions may
be so different that it is impossible to be in compliance with multiple
language, print size, and color requirements of several states."' 52
Furthermore, this approach will necessarily ignore some jurisdictions'
minor, yet compulsory rules.'-
Another approach, called the "absolute compliance" approach,' is
simply to follow the ethics rules of all states in which the lawyer is
licensed to practice, or in which lawyers in a law firm are licensed.1 55
William Hornsby, staff counsel to the American Bar Association
Commission on Advertising, proposes that this approach requires
consideration of where a lawyer has an office, where any lawyer in a
firm is admitted, and where the firm or lawyer is seeking clients.'t
It has been argued that this approach is also infeasible, mainly
because it places an extremely onerous burden upon lawyers and law
firms.157 For a large law firm, with partners and associates licensed to
practice in many jurisdictions, absolute compliance with the rules of
all these jurisdictions would be exceedingly difficult.'" For example,
the firm would have to keep in mind the filing requirements and
record-keeping requirements of each licensing jurisdiction.'5 Even
one minor deviation from this plethora of rules may leave the firm
subject to discipline. Of course, where ethics rules conflict, compliance
under this approach would be impossible.
A further argument against the absolute-compliance approach is
that it would lead to unsightly websites, which would be poor
marketing tools." Many states have specific requirements as to
advertising copy.' 61 For example, Alabama ethics rules require any
communication to include the disclaimer: ."No representation is
made that the quality of legal services to be performed is greater than
the quality of legal services performed by other lawyers.' "1 Florida
ethics rules state that any advertising must declare the following:
"'The hiring of a lawyer is an important decision that should not be
minimize his exposure by following the 'lowest common denominator' approach of
complying with the most restrictive rules of a state wherein he is licensed.").
151. Hill, supra note 11, at 847-48.
152. Id. at 848.
153. Sweet, supra note 22, at 229.
154. Id. at 228.
155. See Westermeier, supra note 5. 23.
156. Hornsby, supra note 135, at 125-28.




161. See id. (citing William E. Hornsby, Jr.. The Ethical Boundaries of Selling Legal
Services in Cyberspace, available at http:llwww.computerbar.org/netethicsabawill.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 1999)).
162. Id (citing Al. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.2(e) (1996)).
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based solely upon advertisements. Before you decide, ask us to send
you free written information about our qualifications and
experience."'163  A website with multiple disclaimers would look
cluttered and unruly, and might cause potential clients to worry about
a firm that has so extensively disclaimed its own assertions.
Another approach that has been suggested is for lawyers with
multiple bar admissions to establish separate websites for each
admitting jurisdiction. 164 This is the approach offered by an ethics
committee in Iowa.165 The Iowa ethics committee determined that an
out-of-state firm with a branch office in Iowa or members licensed to
practice in Iowa should create a distinct website, which would not
refer to the websites for any other offices, and would provide no links
to those websites.16 However, this approach seems impractical,
because it does not take into account the a-jurisdictional nature of the
Internet. Because the alternative websites can be seen in all
jurisdictions, they would give potential clients the impression that they
represented separate firms." This would be confusing to the public,
and would not serve the firm well as a marketing tool.
All of these approaches seemingly address the fundamental
problem with the ABA's approach for designating a choice of law:
the lack of clarity for lawyers when deciding whose ethics rules apply
to their websites. While they are all easily stated, however,
commentators have made strong arguments that difficulties inherent
in actually applying these approaches to real-life situations make them
largely unworkable.
2. Changing the Regulatory Regime
The previously discussed approaches are attempts to work within
the current regime of lawyer regulation. A number of commentators
have proposed alternate solutions, involving fundamental changes to
the advertising ethics rules themselves.
One of these proposals is the creation of entirely new advertising
and solicitation rules dealing exclusively with the Internet. This
approach is premised on the notion that the Internet is a
fundamentally different medium than traditional forms of advertising
such as television, radio, and newspapers. 168 The Internet Law &
Policy Forum, a public policy organization, has proposed that "the
Internet should be recognized as a separate jurisdiction and subject to
163. Id. at 228-29 (citing Fla. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.3(b) (2001)).
164. Id. at 229.
165. See Iowa Sup. Ct., Board of Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-14 (1996).
166. Id.
167. Peter Krakaur, Internet Advertising: States of Disarray? Are Uniform Rules a
More Practical Solution?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1997, at S4, S14.
168. See Athey, supra note 2, at 504-05.
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its own laws and regulations (similar to the medieval law
merchant)." 169 Under this system,
[d]istinct ethical rules would help to emphasize the benefit that the
Web medium offers (providing an easily accessible source of
substantial information to the public), while at the same time
recognizing the ethical disconnect in the minds of most attorneys
between traditional forms of advertising and a presence on the
World Wide Web. 70
The hope is that by separating the Internet from conventional
advertising methods, uniformity will be encouraged in the adoption of
new online advertising rules. However, current advertising rules are
geared toward the prevention of untruthful and deceptive
communications from lawyers to the general public. 7' Any ethical
rules drafted specifically to regulate Internet communications would
necessarily have the same goal.'1 Because jurisdictions differ greatly
on how to achieve this goal, there is no reason to believe that such
differences would not also appear in entirely new ethical rules for the
Internet. Individual states would most likely continue to differ on the
proper way to regulate Internet activity.
Another proposed solution to the lack of uniformity between ethics
rules is the creation of national standards for lawyer
communications." The principle behind this proposal is that
standardized rules will "provide clear guidance [to lawyers] on how to
disseminate information to the public."'' Proponents of this idea
recognize that while interpretations by courts and disciplinary
agencies will necessarily result in some differences between
jurisdictions, "uniform standards wvith interpretive guidelines will go a
long way towards leveling the playing field."'17
National standards would also allow lawyers to more effectively
represent clients, because the public would receive "consistent,
complete and clear" information about the law and the availability of
legal services. 76 National standards would effectively end the
difficulties created by the a-jurisdictional nature of the Internet,
169. Lorelie S. Masters, Professionals Online: Advice for Travels on the
Information Superhighway, The Computer Law., Mar. 1999, at 1. See alsohttp://www.ilpforg.
170. Athey, supra note 2, at 505-06.
171. Louise Hill, Lawyer Advertising 91 (1993).
172. Athey, supra note 2, at 506.
173. A main proponent of this solution, Professor Louise Hill, takes pains to
establish that this approach does not entail national licensing and regulation of
lawyers. "Rather, what this [proposal] suggests are uniform standards on lawyer
communications, with interpretive guidelines, to be regulated by the individual
states." Hill, supra note 11, at 855.
174. Krakaur, supra note 167, at S14.
175. Hill, supra note 11, at 855.
176. Krakaur, supra note 167, at S4.
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because lawyers would no longer have to choose from among
different and conflicting sets of ethics rules. 77
The main problem with such an approach is that it is inconsistent
with the territorial-based system that governs lawyers in the United
States. Who would be able to promulgate a national standard for
regulating attorney advertising? Currently, the source of the law
regulating lawyers is the highest court of each state. 178 It is unrealistic
to believe that courts will give up some of their authority over lawyers
within their jurisdiction simply to increase attorneys' certainty of
which rules govern their website.179
A similar, but more modest, proposal that has been suggested is for
the federal government to promulgate a choice of law rule to address
conflicts among the differing state ethical standards. 8 It is argued
that a national choice of law rule for lawyer conduct would allow
states to continue to maintain diversity in ethics rules, while providing
some measure of uniformity in resolving ethics conflicts.' 81 It would
seem, however, that a federal choice of law rule would run into the
same application problems as Rule 8.5, and would be no improvement
over the current system."8 Nevertheless, one commentator has argued
that such a rule does have an advantage over "even an ideal version of
Model Rule 8.5. ' I83 Because it would be enacted by a single, central
jurisdiction, "it would not be subject to varying state amendments
[and] interpretations."' 4
One author has suggested, however, that it is highly unlikely that
Congress would enact any law regarding choice of law.'85 The
argument is made that the only interest groups that might effectively
push for federal regulation of choice of law are consumer groups, who
would be trying to attain substantive reform, and not a way to help
states regulate more effectively. 86 Furthermore, Congress will be very
unlikely to attempt to usurp the long-standing state right to regulatelawyers.187
177. Hill, supra note 11, at 856.
178. Professional Responsibility: Problems and Materials 41 (Thomas D. Morgan
& Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 2000). However, a few state courts have "ceded limited
authority over lawyers to the state legislatures." Id.
179. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law,
69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1161, 1195 (2001).
180. See Moulton, supra note 73, at 165.
181. Id. at 166-69.
182. See Ribstein, supra note 179, at 1195. ("[Tlhere is no guarantee that [a federal
jurisdictional choice regime] would improve on the current system, while federal law
would forestall further state experimentation on choice of law.").
183. See Moulton, supra note 73, at 166.
184. Id.
185. See Ribstein, supra note 179, at 1195. For a general discussion of the problems
of federal choice of law rules, see Erin A. O' Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics
to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev 1151 (2000).
186. See Ribstein, supra note 179, at 1195.
187. Id. (citing Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the
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Some commentators have raised the issue of doing away with Rule
8.5(b) altogether, and simply relying on existing choice of law
principles.s The argument has been made that lawyers and clients
would both benefit if a disciplinary authority employs its state's
common law rules on choice of law." The thrust of this argument is
simply that it is easier for a lawyer to learn one set of confusing rules
than two.190
However, two reasons have been suggested supporting why lawyers
should have their own separate rules. First, that the existing authority
as to choice of law for ethics rules is so sparse and inconsistent that it
would be unfair to subject lawyers to this negligible body of law.'
Second, that because of the severe nature of the disciplinary sanction,
it is unjust to impose such a remedy without clear prior guidance." -
3. Amending the ABA's Choice of Law Rule
Creating new regimes for regulating attorney advertising and
solicitation will be difficult. A simpler solution to the problem created
by diverging ethics rules may be to address the ambiguities contained
in the Model Rules choice of law provision directly. For example, one
commentator has proposed eliminating the "predominant effect"
language in Model Rule 8.5, and replacing it with a "'client-based"
rule.93 This rule would apply the law of the state in which the client is
domiciled at the time the conduct occurs." Although this provision
Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Erplanation of Federalism,
76 Va. L. Rev. 265 (1990)).
188. Moulton, supra note 73, at 163 ("What would be wrong with consigning
lawyers to consult on their own behalf the same body of conflicts law they consult on
behalf of their clients?"). Currently, most states who have not adopted Rule 8.5(b)
provide for the application of choice of law principles to conflicts between different
jurisdictions' ethics rules. See, e.g., Miss. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 2 (2001)
("If the rules of professional conduct in the two jurisdictions differ, principles of
conflict of laws may apply. Similar problems can arise when a lawyer is licensed to
practice in more than one jurisdiction."); Utah Rules of Prorl Conduct R. 8.5(b) cmt.
3 (2001) ("Where the lawyer is licensed to practice law in two jurisdictions which
impose conflicting obligations, applicable rules of choice of law may govern the
situtation.").
189. See Kathleen Clark, Is Discipline Different? An Essay on Choice of Law and
Lawyer Conduct, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1069, 1072 (1995) (discussing whether lawyers are
advantaged by a choice of law rule tailored to lawyer discipline).
190. Id at 1072.
191. See Moulton, supra note 73, at 163-64; see also supra notes 101-07 and
accompanying text.
192. See Moulton, supra note 73, at 163, 164 (analogizing the disciplinary sanction
to criminal penalties). However, Moulton goes on to argue that even with a special
statutory choice of law rule for legal ethics, the problem of inconsistency is not solved.
which is why he supports a federal choice of law rule. Id. at 164-70.
193. See Colin Owyang, Note. Professional Responsibility and Choice of Law. A
Client-Based Alternative to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 U. Mich. J.L
Reform 459 (1995).
194. Id. at 465.
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would eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the current rule in some
situations,195 it does not address the opposing ethics rules regulating
attorney advertising. In the case of advertising, there is no identified
client whose domicile may be the basis for a choice of law.
Another proposal to amend Rule 8.5 has been made by Professor
Larry Ribstein, specifically in reference to law firms.196  He has
suggested applying ethical rules that relate to the structure of law
firms, 197 including advertising rules, on a firm-wide, rather than a
lawyer-by-lawyer basis.198 Under this system, Rule 8.5 would be
amended to allow an entire law firm (but not individual lawyers) to
pre-select the advertising rules' 99 of any state in which that firm
maintains a branch office.2" This regime of "jurisdictional choice" is
designed to eliminate the problem of individual jurisdictions forcing
their ethical rules on multi-state firms."' 1 While this proposal may also
solve the uncertainty problem for a large firm, it necessarily does little
to aid individual lawyers who market through websites.
III. APPLYING THE "PRINCIPALLY PRACTICES" TEST TO ONLINE
ADVERTISING
A more appropriate change to Rule 8.5(b) may be an amendment
providing that the predominant effect test will not apply to lawyers'
conduct in marketing over the Internet. Under this provision, a
lawyer who is licensed to practice in multiple jurisdictions would look
to the first sentence of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), and conform to the
rules of the jurisdiction in which he "principally practices." 2°z The
"principally practices" standard is also somewhat ambiguous,0 3 but it
is clearer than the predominant effect test "because the primary locale
of the attorney's practice is easier to determine than the primary
locale of the effects of that practice. ''" 2 4 Although the "principally
195. This "client-based" rule was proposed in the context of conflicts involving the
future crime exception to the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of
confidentiality. Id. at 465-68.
196. See Ribstein, supra note 179, at 1195.
197. Professor Ribstein defines "structural" rules as those that "directly affect the
overall organization of the firm." Id. at 1166. Some examples of structural ethical
rules include vicarious liability rules, restrictions on who can own shares in the firm,
rules requiring screening structures, and rules concerning promotion and advertising
of the firm. Id. at 1166-77
198. Id. at 1164.
199. As well as other "structural" rules, identified as ABA Model Rules 1.10, 5.1-
5.7, and 7.1-7.6. Id. at 1190-91.
200. Id. at 1190-94.
201. Id. at 1203 (arguing that such a scheme would "facilitate competition,
experimentation and variation in ethical rules").
202. Model Rules of Prof'l Responsibility R. 8.5 (2000).
203. Owyang, supra note 193, at 465.
204. Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 1547, 1589 (1994).
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practices" test may be difficult to apply to a large firm with offices in
many jurisdictions, disciplinary tribunals and courts could simplify this
problem by utilizing a test similar to the one used by diversity courts
to determine a corporation's "principal place of business." 2 5
A hypothetical may help to explain how this amendment would add
certainty to choice of law in the ethics realm. An attorney, with offices
and most of his clients in State A, wishes to market his practice on the
Internet to residents of State A. He is licensed to practice in both
State A and State B, which have conflicting rules on the type size for
attorney websites. State A mandates that all disclaimers be in 15-
point type, while State B requires 20-point. Assume, for the purpose
of this hypothetical, that anything larger than 15-point type would be
an ethical violation in State A.
Under the predominant effect test, the attorney would have to
guess where a disciplinary tribunal might determine the website had
the most impact, a seemingly impossible task since it will be seen
equally in both jurisdictions. Following the "least common
denominator"2 6 or the "absolute compliance 2 7 approaches would
not aid the attorney, because of the direct conflict between the rules
of State A and State B. If the attorney is licensed to practice in more
states than just A and B, the problem becomes even more
complicated.
Applying the "principally practices" test to these facts eliminates
the dilemma that our attorney faces. Because his office is located in
State A, and most of his clients are in State A, the lawyer will be
justified in believing that a court will find he principally practices in
State A. Therefore, he can confidently use 15-point type on his
website. Even if the attorney had an equal amount of clients from
State A and State B, or also kept an office in State B, a court can
perform a relatively uncomplicated factual analysis to determine in
which state he principally practices. Analogizing to the "principal
place of business" test for corporate citizenship in diversity cases, a
court can look at the locale of the attorney's legal activities and the
location of offices to decide where the attorney principally practices 2 -
As can be seen from the hypothetical, the main advantage of
eliminating the predominant effect test is that it greatly reduces the
ambiguity of the Model Rule, and provides certainty and
predictability to the attorney who markets his practice online. By
shrinking the conflicting obligations that the predominant effect test
places on an attorney, this proposal comes closest to satisfying the
205. Id (advocating applying only the "principally practices" test to conflicts of
confidentiality rules). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2001).
206. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
208. See Mary Kay Kane, Civil Procedure in a Nutshell 13 (4th ed. 1996).
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intent of the drafters of Model Rule 8.5(b), which was to "provide
clear answers to [choice of law] problems in nearly all cases.""2 o9
A drawback to this rule is that it only takes into account the
interests of the state in which the attorney conducts the majority of his
practice, while sacrificing the substantive policy interests inured in the
ethics rules of the forty-nine other jurisdictions where websites can be
accessed.210 However, as the Restatement (Second) on Conflict of
Laws recognizes, "any rule of choice of law... represents an
accommodation of conflicting values. 21' The tension between
competing state interests is outweighed by the need for greater
certainty for lawyers employing websites. Furthermore, it is difficult
to argue that any one foreign jurisdiction has a greater policy interest
in regulating an attorney's online conduct because the website can be
seen in all jurisdictions equally.
Because this new rule would apply only to lawyers marketing
themselves through their websites, it does not restrict the interest
analysis reflected in the predominant effect test in other situations,
outside the context of the Internet, where the predominant effect of
conduct is easier to ascertain. In those cases, the choice of law would
continue to recognize the appropriate regulatory interests of foreign
jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
The legal profession's growing presence on the Internet raises
numerous ethical dilemmas for attorneys. The disparity among states'
rules of professional responsibility make any analysis of these ethical
considerations extremely complex, especially with regard to attorneys
marketing themselves through websites. The agencies that regulate
the practice of law in this country must attempt to reduce the
uncertainty and risk created by their own choice of law rules, which
force lawyers to contend with varying standards. Because uniformity
of advertising rules on a national basis is unlikely to be achieved, bar
associations should promulgate a choice of law rule that gives lawyers
confidence in their choice of whose rules to follow. They must also
ensure that the public receives consistent, clear, and correct
information about the law and the availability of legal services.
Lawyers need to be able to predict how their actions will be
interpreted in order to conduct themselves properly in the practice of
law.213 A choice of law rule that removes the focus on the
predominant effect test for legal websites will serve this goal. Such a
209. Gillers & Simon, supra note 113, at 451 (excerpting ABA Committee Report
explaining 1993 Amendment to Rule 8.5).
210. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
211. Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. c (1971).
212. See Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 6 (2001).
213. Hill, supra note 11, at 856.
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rule would provide much clearer guidance for lawyers on how to
disseminate information online, while still allowing state regulatory
agencies to control the conduct of lawyers within their jurisdiction.
Notes & Observations
